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ABSTRACT
Client Experiencing in Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment for Eating Disorders
James W. VanDyke
Department of Psychology, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
Depth of client experiencing has been associated with positive therapeutic outcomes across
theoretical orientations. Experiencing describes a particular mode of cognitive-affective
processing in which clients use internal felt experience as the basis for self-examination and the
resolution of personally significant issues. Given evidence that eating disorders are associated
with particular disruptions of cognitive-affective processing, it is likely that experiencing plays a
role in the successful treatment of eating pathology. However, no study to date has examined the
relationship between experiencing and outcome in eating disorder treatment. The purposes of the
current study were to examine depth of client experiencing during cognitive-behavioral treatment
for eating disorders and to investigate the relationship between experiencing and outcome.
Regression analyses suggested no significant relationship between depth of experiencing and
outcome. However, results indicated that a restricted range of experiencing occurred during the
treatment, which may have limited the possibility of detecting a relationship. A number of
factors that may have contributed to the restricted range of experiencing in the sample are
considered and discussed.
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Client Experiencing in Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment for Eating Disorders
Experiencing is a well-established construct in the theoretical and empirical literatures on
psychotherapeutic change (Bohart, 1993; Klein, Mathieu-Coughlan, & Kiesler, 1986; PascualLeone & Greenberg, 2007). Deep levels of in-session client experiencing have been consistently
associated with positive psychotherapeutic outcomes (e.g., Hendricks, 2002). Further research is
needed with regard to the relationship between depth of experiencing and therapeutic outcome,
including investigation of the conditions under which experiencing is likely to occur with
therapeutic benefit and the client populations for whom experiencing is most relevant to positive
change (Wiser & Arnow, 2001). The current study is an effort to shed light on how experiencing
might relate to the change processes and outcomes of cognitive-behavioral treatment for
individuals with eating disorders.
First, I will describe the experiencing construct, including its relationship to human
functioning and its operationalization in psychotherapy research. Second, I will present a review
of literature showing how experiencing relates to models of adaptive cognitive-affective
processing. Third, I will review evidence that particular disruptions of cognitive-affective
processing contribute to the development and maintenance of eating psychopathology, such that
in-session experiencing would seem to be relevant to the alleviation of associated symptoms.
The Experiencing Construct
Experiencing refers to a dynamic process in which internal felt sensations are used as the
basis for examination of self and situation (Klein, Mathieu, Gendlin, & Kiesler, 1969; Wiser &
Arnow, 2001). An individual engaged in experiencing directs attention inward, identifies
emergent feelings, and tries to make sense of how these relate to his or her life and personality
(Fitzpatrick, Peternelli, Stalikas, & Iwakabe, 1999; Greenberg, Rice, & Elliott, 1993; Hendricks,
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2002). This process is thought to promote insight, understanding, and effective problem-solving
efforts relative to issues of personal significance (Greenberg, Korman, & Paivio, 2002; Kiesler,
1973; Stalikas & Fitzpatrick, 1997). For example, someone who becomes aware of unexpected
anger in a particular situation might attend to and explore the nature of associated feelings and
come to understand them in terms of his or her unique history, values, and goals. Such
understanding could then be utilized toward re-evaluation and/or behavioral change relative to
the evoking situation (McGuire, 1991).
The felt sense. The internal referent of experiencing, often denoted as a felt sense,
involves a complex integration of physiological, cognitive, and emotional aspects of the self as
they are occurring in the present moment (Gendlin, 1991; Klein et al., 1986). Thus, it entails a
preverbal visceral sensing that encompasses the whole of one’s phenomenal field, including
emotional reactions as well as somatic sensations, cognitive meanings, and reflexive awareness
(Gendlin, 1991; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997; Klein et al., 1986). Accordingly, felt senses may be
experienced with varying degrees of clarity and complexity (Gendlin, 1991). For instance, when
experiencing involves a discrete emotional response to evoking stimuli (e.g., fear at threat,
sadness at loss, anger at violation; Gendlin, 1991; Lazarus, 2006), the symbolization of the felt
sense may be relatively simple, clear, and action-oriented (e.g., “I feel afraid, and want to run
away”). By contrast, when experiencing involves a richer, subtler internal sense (e.g., “I feel
down in the dumps,” “I feel all washed up”), the implicit meaning of experience may emerge
only through more extensive engagement with and elaboration of the initial felt sense (Greenberg
et al., 2002).
Relationship to functioning. As the mechanism whereby phenomenological experience
is brought into conscious awareness, experiencing is regarded as central to adaptive human
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functioning (e.g., Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). Specifically, as internal experience comes to be
symbolized and understood in the context of past, present, and future, it lends meaning and
continuity to one’s living (Gendlin, 1962, 1991; McGuire, 1991; Pos, Greenberg, Goldman, &
Korman, 2003); it provides access to critical information about the state of the self relative to the
environment (Greenberg et al., 1993; Wiser & Arnow, 2001); and it informs problem-solving,
decision-making, and other purposive actions (Gendlin, 1962; Greenberg, 2008; Stalikas &
Fitzpatrick, 1997). Insofar as these processes are facilitative of change and health, experiencing
is regarded as theoretically relevant across therapeutic contexts and personal growth situations
(Klein et al., 1986).
Operationalization. In psychotherapy research, experiencing has been operationalized
into measurable verbal behaviors (Klein et al., 1969). Experiencing is conceptualized as a series
of stages reflecting progression from abstract impersonal communications with no internal
referent, through the investigation and elaboration of felt meaning in conscious awareness. The
deepening of in-session experiencing reflects increasing ownership of feelings, self-revelation,
and problem orientation in the verbal communications of the client (Klein et al., 1969). Ratings
of experiencing represent the phenomenological status of the client, with the recognition that he
or she may be more or less able and/or willing to communicate about inner experience in the
presence of the therapist (Kiesler, 1973; Klein et al., 1969).
Depth of in-session client experiencing has been shown to have a robust positive
association with therapeutic outcome, particularly within humanistic and experiential traditions
(Elliott, Greenberg, & Lietaer, 2004; Hendricks, 2002; Klein et al., 1986; Orlinsky & Howard,
1978; Todd & Bohart, 1999). Moreover, initial investigations of experiencing in cognitivebehavioral and psychodynamic therapies (Castonguay, Goldfried, Wiser, Raue, & Hayes, 1996;
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Silberschatz, Fretter, & Curtis, 1986; Watson & Bedard, 2006) have supported the notion that it
represents a key component of change across theoretical orientations (see Greenberg & PascualLeone, 2006; Whelton, 2004).
Experiencing and Emotional Processing
Although experiencing is not limited to emotional arousal or expression, it often includes
or generates emotions (e.g., McGuire, 1991; Wiser & Arnow, 2001). Accordingly, the
experiencing construct has often been central to investigations of emotional processing (e.g.,
Castonguay et al., 1996; Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 2006; Watson & Bedard, 2006; Wiser &
Goldfried, 1998). At the broadest level, emotional processing refers to all the tacit and explicit
processes that influence the generation, experience, and regulation of emotion (Pos et al., 2003;
Whelton, 2004). From this perspective, experiencing is viewed as the means whereby emotions
can be brought into conscious awareness, evaluated, understood, and used to guide planning,
decision-making, and behavior (Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). Emotional processing is thus
viewed as a particular mode of experiencing, in which the cognitive elaboration of a felt sense
involves a specific emotion (Pos et al., 2003; Pos, Greenberg, & Warwar, 2009).
Indeed, many theories of emotional processing parallel the elaborative processes
described by the experiencing construct, emphasizing a progression from initial raw affect, to
specific emotions, to conscious meaning-laden feelings (e.g., Greenberg & Safran, 1987;
Guidano, 1991; Lazarus, 2006; Leahy, 2002; Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2007). In such
models, emotional experience begins at a pre-reflective level, and is then processed through
levels of increasing differentiation and elaboration, at which emotions are perceived or felt, then
attended to, then labeled and interpreted. Disruptions at any stage of this process can lead to
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difficulty understanding one’s emotional experience and using it to guide behavior in adaptive
ways (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999).
Experiencing and Emotional Expression
Theory and research have also emphasized the importance of emotional expression in
psychotherapeutic process (e.g., Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001). The deliberate expression or
non-expression of an emotion follows from evaluation of the emotion as appropriate relative to
personal values and perception of the social context (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999).
Accordingly, disruptions of emotional expression may reflect and/or lead to disruptions of the
elaborative processing associated with experiencing. Such a caveat underlines the importance of
assessing and possibly working to modify client beliefs about the experience and expression of
emotion in order to facilitate adaptive emotional processing during therapy (e.g., Leahy, 2002).
Cognitive-Affective Processing
Contemporary theories of dual processing suggest that deeper levels of experiencing
promote psychological health and therapeutic change by fostering adaptive integration of affect
and cognition (Mahoney, 1991). In this perspective, humans possess two distinct but interacting
systems for creating meaning, one affective/experiential and one cognitive/rational (e.g., Epstein,
1994; Guidano, 1991). Processing at the experiential level is global, integrated, and holistic,
yielding a subjective felt sense of one’s spatial and affective relationship to the environment
(Damasio, 1994, 1999; Epstein, 1994). Such processing corresponds to the felt sense at the basis
of experiencing. By contrast, processing at the cognitive level is somewhat slower and
dominated by logic and reason, facilitating more deliberate, differentiated evaluations of internal
and external events (Epstein, 1994; Guidano, 1991; Lazarus, 1991a; LeDoux, 1996, 2007). It is
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this level of processing that allows a person to direct attention to and explicate the implicit
meaning of an internal felt sense.
The dialectical interplay of cognitive and experiential processing over the course of
individual development is thought to yield increasingly sophisticated and idiosyncratic
representations of phenomenological experience and conceptual knowledge, which can promote
more thorough, deliberate, and efficient marshaling of resources relative to stimuli of personal
significance (Damasio, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Greenberg
et al., 1993; Lazarus, 2006; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Moreover, adaptive development
toward meeting biopsychosocial needs is characterized by balanced integration between
cognitive and experiential processing (e.g., Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b; Pascual-Leone, 1991). As
noted by Kennedy-Moore and Watson (2001), “Relying solely on rational processing means that
one is cut off from a rich source of information about oneself and the impact of the environment,
whereas relying solely on experiential processing entails being driven blindly by diffuse affective
responses” (p. 194). Thus, given its emphasis on the elaboration of felt experience in conscious
awareness, experiencing in therapy is viewed as promoting well-being, in part, by fostering
balanced integration of affect and cognition (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1993).
This contention is consistent with evidence from across therapeutic orientations that the
cognitive elaboration of in-session affective experience can promote adaptive behaviors and
positive, enduring change (Bohart & Tallman, 1999; Borkovec, Roemer, & Kinyon, 1995;
Greenberg & Safran, 1987; Guidano, 1991). For instance, in a recent review of research across
humanistic-experiential, behavioral, psychodynamic, cognitive, and health psychology
orientations, Whelton (2004) argued that therapeutic change is promoted when processes of
emotion are facilitated through structured sequences of attention, articulation, reflection,
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exploration, and meaning creation. Noting that such sequences are central to research on wellestablished constructs such as experiencing and emotional processing, he concluded that the
deepest transformations in therapy result from processing that combines emotional arousal with
cognitive reflection on the significance and meaning of emotional experience (Whelton, 2004).
Therapeutic Processes Promoted by Experiencing
Wiser and Arnow (2001) have provided a cogent framework for understanding how client
experiencing promotes enduring therapeutic change. Drawing on contemporary emotion theory,
these authors suggest that experiencing helps clients gain access to critical information about the
self in relation to the environment, which information can be utilized toward the formation of
adaptive behavioral responses and the resolution of personally meaningful issues. Specifically,
they argue that access to experiential information promotes two important processes: (a) the
evaluation and potential modification of tacit belief systems, and (b) the initiation of new
behaviors prompted by adaptive action tendencies (Wiser & Arnow, 2001).
In psychotherapy research, facilitating client experiencing has frequently been viewed as
promoting the uncovering, explication, evaluation, and potential modification of tacit meaning
systems (e.g., Greenberg, 2008; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997; Teasdale, 1993). As noted by the
authors of the Experiencing Scale, the basic construct of experiencing is an internal felt sense,
which includes the implicit meanings that structure the sensations and feelings that arise in
interaction with the environment (Klein et al., 1986). Many theorists have suggested that such
implicit meanings are generated by networks of densely integrated cognition and affect,
synthesized through individual experience and learning (e.g., Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999;
Greenberg & Safran, 1987; Teasdale, 1993). These cognitive-affective networks have thus been
identified as targets for therapeutic intervention (Greenberg, 2008; Pos et al., 2003).
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Consistent with these arguments, Wiser and Arnow (2001) hold that a central goal of all
therapies is the promotion of enduring and adaptive shifts in clients’ tacit frameworks for
perceiving and understanding self, others, and situations. They note that such frameworks tend
to be strongly associated with behavior, and may be inaccessible to rational exploration without
affective engagement (see also, Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000). In light of related evidence,
Wiser and Arnow (2001) assert that insofar as experiencing includes engagement with pre-verbal
affective material in combination with active cognitive exploration of associated systems of
meaning and belief, it is likely to promote enduring and adaptive shifts in the way clients
perceive and understand themselves, others, and situations.
In addition, Wiser and Arnow (2001) suggest that experiencing promotes therapeutic
change by fostering stronger connections with biologically driven action tendencies. This
contention draws on theory and research characterizing emotion as a fundamentally adaptive,
orienting, and meaning-producing system, which has evolved to promote self-preservation and
self-enhancement (Greenberg et al., 2002; Greenberg & Safran, 1989; Lazarus, 1991b, 2006;
Mahoney, 1991). In this view, emotions are thought to inform people of the significance of
events to their well-being, to organize them for rapid action, and to constitute a primary signaling
system for regulating interpersonal interaction (Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1991; LeDoux, 1996; Oatley
& Jenkins, 1992; Sroufe, 1996). A number of theorists have thus emphasized that access to
emotions and their associated action tendencies is crucial for adaptive responding to an everchanging array of biological, psychological, and social exigencies (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1993;
Mahoney, 1991; Tomkins, 1963). Accordingly, Wiser and Arnow (2001) assert that
experiencing allows clients to more fully experience the self-preservative action impulses
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associated with felt senses, which impulses provide motivation to cease maladaptive behaviors
and/or initiate more functional, self-enhancing ones.
Finally, Wiser and Arnow (2001) provide some tentative guidelines as to which clients
might be most and least likely to benefit from the facilitation of experiencing. Relative to the
first group, they suggest that clients who selectively or habitually avoid emotional experiencing,
clients who exhibit maladaptive behavioral responses, and clients whose frameworks of meaning
have been shattered should be helped to access the critical information and novel meaning
construction that experiencing can provide. By contrast, they categorize clients who become
confused, dysregulated, or overwhelmed by emotional experience; clients who cope with
heightened experiencing in destructive ways; clients who are not engaged in fundamentally
adaptive emotional responses; and clients who do not experience trust in the therapeutic
relationship as those who might derive the least benefit from experiencing. Nonetheless, Wiser
and Arnow (2001) note that the facilitation of experiencing in order to uncover and clarify
feelings, beliefs, and meanings may still be indicated for clients in the second group, especially if
such clients are first trained to regulate their internal experience through the use of adaptive
coping strategies.
Disruptions of Cognitive-Affective Processing in Eating Disorders
Individuals with eating disorders have long been cited as a population that has difficulty
making sense of internal experience and using it to guide behavior (e.g., Bruch, 1962; Fox,
2009). Affective and emotional factors have received particular attention, with evidence
suggesting a double bind in which eating-disordered individuals not only experience elevated
levels of negative affect compared to controls (Whiteside et al., 2007; Wolff, Crosby, Roberts, &
Wittrock, 2000), but are also ill-equipped to process such affect in adaptive ways (Fox &

10
Harrison, 2008; Gilboa-Schechtman, Avnon, Zubery, & Jeczmien, 2006; Meyer, Leung, Barry,
& De Feo, 2010; Meyer, Waller, & Waters, 1998; Stice, 2001). Indeed, research among
individuals with eating disorders has identified a number of factors that would be expected to
disrupt cognitive-affective processing at the levels of perception, attention, interpretation, and
elaboration described by the experiencing construct (e.g., Bydlowski et al., 2005; Fox &
Harrison, 2008; Geller, Cockell, Goldner, & Flett, 2000; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2006;
Harrison, Sullivan, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2009).
Investigation of such disruptions is crucial to the effective treatment of these disorders,
given that cognitive-affective processing appears to be of central relevance in the etiology and
maintenance of eating psychopathology (Bydlowski et al., 2005; Fox & Power, 2009). In fact,
some authors have even suggested that eating disorders might be characterized as a subtype of
emotional disorders (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2006). To begin with, there is ample evidence
that negative affective and emotional states often precipitate episodes of disordered eating
behavior (Meyer et al., 2010; Stice, 2001). Moreover, a growing body of empirical literature
supports the notion that restriction, bingeing, and purging behaviors function as strategies to
suppress, modify, and/or manage emotional experience (Cooper, Wells, & Todd, 2004;
Corstophine, Mountford, Tomlinson, Waller, & Meyer, 2007; Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran,
2003; Fox, 2009; Harrison et al., 2009; Overton, Selway, Strongman, & Houston, 2005; Sim &
Zeman, 2004). In combination, such findings highlight the importance of understanding how
individuals with eating disorders respond to and process internal experience, particularly affect
and emotion, and how associated deficits may contribute to the development and maintenance of
the disorders themselves (Corstophine et al., 2007; Fox & Power, 2009).
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A wealth of evidence suggests that disordered eating is associated with limited capacity
to clarify one’s affective states. For example, research has consistently shown a relationship
between disordered eating and alexithymia, which is characterized by limited ability to identify
feelings and differentiate them from other bodily sensations, limited ability to describe and
communicate feelings to others, and externally oriented thinking (Bydlowski et al., 2005;
Lawson, Emanuelli, Sines, & Waller, 2008; Speranza et al., 2005; Taylor, Parker, Bagby, &
Bourke, 1996; van Strien & Wuwens, 2007). Eating psychopathology has also been linked with
a number of related constructs, including low emotional awareness (Gilboa-Schechtman et al.,
2006) and poor interoceptive awareness (Merwin, Zucker, Lacy, & Elliott, 2010), each of which
describes not only low tendency to attend to internal experience, but also limited ability to
differentiate somatic and affective states. Taken together, such findings suggest that individuals
with eating disorders are likely to manifest cognitive-affective processing deficits at levels of
perception and attention, which may prevent internal experience from being adequately
differentiated and/or symbolized.
Not surprisingly, lack of clarity with regard to internal experience among eating
disordered individuals has been associated with interpersonal difficulties, including impaired
ability to judge the internal experience of others (Bydlowski et al., 2005), and with poor
treatment outcome (Speranza, Loas, Wallier, & Corcos, 2007). In light of aforementioned
research on experiencing and cognitive-affective processing (e.g., Whelton, 2004), one might
suspect that this latter finding reflects, at least in part, a limited capacity on the part of the treated
individuals to engage in the sort of verbal processing thought to characterize effective
psychotherapy.
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Moreover, deficiencies in the ability to differentiate bodily states and/or relate them to
affect may play a direct role in maintaining disordered eating behaviors. For instance, recent
theory and research suggest that, in individuals with eating disorders, body dissatisfaction and
“feeling fat” come to function as proxies for negative affect in general (Fairburn, 2008). In this
view, a tendency to mislabel certain emotional states (e.g., boredom, loneliness, or sadness) and
bodily experiences (e.g., feeling full, hot, or sweaty) as feelings of “fatness” is thought to trigger
efforts to resolve such feelings through strategies focused on eating, shape, and weight (Fairburn,
2008; Fox & Power, 2009). A similar process is thought to result when somatic and affective
states are adequately identified, but routinely misattributed to fatness or body dissatisfaction
(Kearney-Cooke & Striegel-Moore, 1997; Sim & Zeman, 2005). From such perspectives,
deficits in the ability to clarify internal states are thought to result in displacement of negative
feelings onto the body (e.g., Dolhanty & Greenberg, 2009), and disordered eating behaviors
represent an indiscriminate approach to coping with somatic and affective responses that are
ambiguous and/or misunderstood (Fox & Power, 2009).
Individuals with eating disorders also appear to view certain internal states in an
exceptionally negative light. For instance, increased levels of eating psychopathology have been
associated with fear and guilt regarding affective experience (Merwin et al., 2010) and with
perceptions of threat from emotions, especially anger (Ioannou & Fox, 2009). Associated
research also suggests that such views often manifest in negative attitudes and beliefs relative to
the expression of internal experience (e.g., Lawson et al., 2008). For instance, women with
concerns about eating, shape, and weight have been found to be significantly more likely to
believe that expressing emotions is a sign of weakness, that emotions should be kept under
control, and that emotional displays would lead to negative social consequences (Lawson et al.,
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2008; Meyer et al., 2010). Findings of this nature not only suggest a lack of acceptance relative
to the experience and expression of certain internal states, but again highlight emotional
experience as particularly problematic within an eating disordered population.
Clearly, negative beliefs about the expression of affect and emotion would be expected to
inhibit verbal processing, such as might take place with a supportive friend, family member, or
counselor. At a more implicit level, the evaluation of internal experience as undesirable,
threatening, or otherwise unacceptable would be expected to inhibit attention to that experience,
preventing further differentiation, elaboration, and understanding (Kennedy-Moore & Watson,
1999). Indeed, among eating disordered individuals, the presence of negative attitudes toward
affect and emotion has been associated not only with inhibited emotional expression, but also
with aforementioned deficits in describing one’s feelings to others (Geller et al., 2000; Ioannou
& Fox, 2009; Lawson et al., 2008).
Furthermore, there is growing consensus that negative evaluations of affect and emotion
(e.g., as problematic, uncontrollable, etc.) are not only associated with simplistic understanding
of internal experience, but may also mediate aforementioned connections between emotional
distress and disordered eating behaviors (Fox, 2009; Leahy, 2002). Specifically, evidence
suggests that it is not merely the presence or quantity of negative affect that predicts disordered
eating, but rather, the interpretation of such affect as intolerable and/or ego-dystonic (Fox &
Power, 2009). Thus, while theory and research suggest numerous reasons why individuals with
eating disorders might experience negative affect (e.g., failure to live up to distorted ideals of
body image, Stice, Presnell, & Spangler, 2002), it appears that negative perceptions of the affect
itself can sometimes determine whether that experience will precipitate disordered eating
behaviors.
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Such findings link eating psychopathology to the construct of experiential avoidance,
which refers to a process in which the negative evaluation of internal events, such as thoughts,
feelings, and bodily sensations, is associated not only with an unwillingness to remain in contact
with these events, but also with deliberate efforts to control, suppress, or escape from them
(Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; S. C. Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996).
Experiential avoidance presents a conceptual counterpart to the notion of experiencing, and
would, by definition, be expected to disrupt associated processes of attention and elaboration.
Evidence suggests that experiential avoidance is a common function served by a number
of maladaptive behaviors (e.g., substance use, high-risk sexual behavior), and may be
particularly relevant in the development and maintenance of eating disorders (Chawla & Ostafin,
2007; Hayaki, 2009; S. C. Hayes et al., 1996; Kingston, Clarke, & Remington, 2010; Koff &
Sangani, 1997; Rawal, Park, & Williams, 2010). For instance, binge eating is thought to serve a
numbing function relative to negative affect (e.g., Overton et al., 2005). Similarly, restriction
appears to facilitate avoidance or “blanking out” of emotional states (Serpell, Treasure, Teasdale,
& Sullivan, 1999, p. 180). In addition, associated research tends to underscore the motivation to
avoid experiencing among individuals with eating disorders, as noted in Reindl’s description of a
sample of women who “had not been sensing self-experience because when they focused inward
they felt unbearable inadequacy and shame and experienced unmanageable chaos and
fragmentation” (Reindl, 2001, p. 34).
Findings such as these dovetail with the notion that disordered eating behaviors reflect a
desire to escape from self-awareness (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Meyer et al., 1998).
From this perspective, individuals with eating disorders experience themselves as failing to live
up to rigid standards, yielding unflattering evaluations of the self, accompanied by intense
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emotional distress. Disordered eating behaviors—including bingeing, purging, and, to some
extent, dieting—are thought to entail a narrowing of attention to immediate sensations, which
prevents the conscious experience of these aversive thoughts and feelings (Heatherton &
Baumeister, 1991). In addition, given that the physiological consequences of disordered eating
behaviors (e.g., inadequate nutrition, electrolyte imbalance, low blood glucose levels, etc.) have
been shown to impair perception, mental processing, and mood regulation (Reindl, 2001), such
evidence suggests a vicious cycle in which the avoidance of aversive internal experience through
disordered eating behavior diminishes one’s capacity to process subsequent cognitive and
affective material in adaptive ways (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991).
In summary, disordered eating is associated not only with a lack of clarity regarding
internal experience, but also with a lack of acceptance relative to certain kinds of internal
experience, particularly affect and emotion (Merwin et al., 2010). This lack of acceptance may
involve negative views regarding the experience and/or expression of affective and emotional
states, as well as deliberate efforts to avoid these states through maladaptive behaviors, such as
restriction, bingeing, and purging. Deficiencies of cognitive-affective processing thus appear not
only to play a role in the development and maintenance of eating disorder symptomatology
(Bydlowski et al., 2005; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2006), but also to impact an individual’s
ability to effectively engage in psychotherapeutic treatment through adaptive emotional
expression (Ioannou & Fox, 2009).
Experiencing in the Treatment of Eating Disorders
In light of the above findings, the processes of attention, differentiation, symbolization,
and elaboration described by the experiencing construct are regarded as particularly relevant to
the treatment of individuals with eating disorders (Dolhanty & Greenberg, 2009; Fox & Power,
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2009; Merwin et al., 2010). Indeed, Reindl (2001) not only describes a profound disconnection
from internal experience as a defining feature of eating psychopathology, but also characterizes
recovery, in part, as “a process of learning to sense one’s self, to attune to one’s subjective
physical, psychic, and social self-experience” (p. 5).
Deep levels of experiencing would be expected to promote greater clarity, acceptance,
and understanding of affective and emotional states (Watson & Bedard, 2006; Whelton, 2004;
Wiser & Arnow, 2001; Wiser & Goldfried, 1998), which could prevent recourse to maladaptive
eating behaviors as a means of addressing perceived problems and/or avoiding associated affect.
Experiencing would also be expected to facilitate the uncovering and modification of tacit
meaning systems, including negative views toward emotion (Meyer et al., 2010) as well as
dysfunctional schemes for evaluating self-worth in terms of body shape and weight (Stice et al.,
2002). In addition, contemporary emotion theory suggests that deep levels of experiencing could
help clients with eating disorders to access adaptive urges associated with avoided affect, which
could aid in the determination, initiation, and maintenance of goal-directed actions related to
changing disordered eating behaviors (Wiser & Arnow, 2001).
Consistent with such reasoning, recent years have seen calls for increased promotion of
cognitive-affective processing in eating disorder treatment, especially interventions that help
clients to attend to and explore aversive thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations (Merwin et al.,
2010). For example, it has been suggested that therapy for eating psychopathology should
facilitate conscious reflection on the in-session experience of painful emotion in order to
promote greater self-awareness and the development of new schematic models about internal
experience (Fox & Power, 2009). This recommendation closely parallels the conceptualization
of deep-level experiencing in terms of both process (cognitive elaboration of the felt sense in
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conscious awareness) and positive corollaries (increased awareness, reorganization of internal
cognitive-affective networks) (Greenberg, 2008; Klein et al., 1969).
Unfortunately, there have been few investigations as to the relationship between
cognitive-affective processing and outcome in the treatment of eating disorders. Although the
late 1980s saw numerous efforts to develop experiential therapies for eating disorders (see
Hornyak & Baker, 1989), the foundations of such therapies were characterized as more
theoretical than empirical (Perri, 1989). Similarly, some contemporary therapies (e.g.,
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Dialectical Behavior Therapy) have sought to address
cognitive-affective processing deficits through strategies related to acceptance and mindfulness;
however, empirical research as to the effectiveness of these treatments with eating disordered
clients has thus far been limited (Merwin et al., 2010).
One notable exception is a study of group CBT for binge eating disorder, in which both
positive and negative emotions were found to play a role in therapeutic outcome, depending on
the point in treatment (Castonguay, Pincus, Agras, & Hines, 1998). Although this study assessed
emotional experience in terms of self-reported feelings and perceived group climates, rather than
experiencing per se, the pattern of results nonetheless supported the therapeutic value of
integrated cognitive-affective processing, as noted in the subtitle of the resultant article: When
things have to feel worse before they get better (Castonguay et al., 1998).
In addition, Dolhanty and Greenberg (2009) published a study of Emotion-Focused
Therapy in a case of anorexia nervosa, in which they described the successful implementation of
a treatment that aimed specifically to increase awareness of, and capacity to manage, affective
experience. At 18 months, the client had maintained weight gained during hospitalization prior
to treatment, and showed improvement on measures of depression, alexithymia, and emotional
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awareness (Dolhanty & Greenberg, 2009). These results represent a direct application of theory
on cognitive-affective processing in the successful treatment of an individual with an eating
disorder.
Thus, initial findings are consistent with the notion that depth of experiencing is related
to positive outcome in eating disorder treatment. Nonetheless, there is an ongoing need to
supplement theoretical understanding of cognitive-affective processes in eating disorders with
empirical evidence as to the relationship of such processes to treatment outcome (Castonguay et
al., 1998; Corstophine et al., 2007; Dolhanty & Greenberg, 2009; Fox, 2009; Gilboa-Schechtman
et al., 2006; Sim & Zeman, 2005).
Aims and Hypotheses
The current study was designed to investigate the relationship between in-session client
experiencing and outcome in a sample of eating disorder clients treated using Enhanced
Cognitive Behavior Therapy for eating disorders (CBT-E; Fairburn, 2008). The study had three
specific aims:
Aim 1: Describe the degree to which in-session experiencing occurred during the
treatment of the individuals sampled to provide an initial indication of how much experiencing is
likely to occur in CBT-E.
Aim 2: Examine the relationship between levels of in-session experiencing and three
indicators of post-treatment outcome: eating-related thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; bodyrelated thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; and overall outcome as measured by the combination
of these.
Aim 3: Examine whether perceptions of the experience and expression of emotion
moderate the relationship between experiencing and outcome.
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Relative to these aims, the following hypotheses were made: Based on previous findings
regarding levels of experiencing during cognitive therapy (Castonguay et al., 1996; Watson &
Bedard, 2006; Wiser & Goldfried, 1993), it was expected that experiencing would be present in
the sessions selected, with variability among clients across therapy. However, because the
Experiencing Scale had never been utilized in an investigation of emotional processing in eating
disorders, this hypothesis was exploratory (Aim 1).
Experiencing was predicted to show a relationship with outcome similar to that in past
studies. Specifically, it was expected that individuals who reached deeper levels of experiencing
and/or those who showed increased levels of experiencing over the course of treatment, would
have better outcomes (Bohart, 1993; Hendricks, 2002). Thus, higher levels of experiencing were
predicted to be associated with decreased post-treatment eating disorder symptomatology (i.e.,
fewer eating-related and body-related thoughts, feelings, and behaviors), and clients who showed
an increase in depth of experiencing across therapy were predicted to show better treatment
outcomes (Aim 2).
Finally, given evidence that negative attitudes toward emotion are associated with
decreased emotional processing (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999; Lawson et al., 2008; Leahy,
2002; Meyer et al., 2010), it was predicted that views of emotion would moderate the
relationship between depth of experiencing and outcome, such that individuals who reported
more positive views of the experience and expression of emotion at intake would show a
stronger positive relationship between experiencing and outcome (Aim 3).
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Method
Data
Data was obtained from Spangler’s (2009) efficacy study of cognitive-behavior therapy
for eating disorders. All sessions from this study were videotaped. The study also incorporated
an assessment battery relative to eating disorder symptomatology.
Participants
Participants in the initial treatment study (2009) were recruited through fliers, newspaper
ads, and referrals to the Brigham Young University (BYU) Comprehensive Clinic. Following an
initial telephone screening, potential participants underwent an in-person diagnostic assessment
using the Eating Disorders Examination, an established interview-based diagnostic measure for
eating disorders. Assessors received weekly on-site training and supervision from Dr. Diane
Spangler.
Participants were excluded from the study if they had comorbid psychosis, bipolar
disorder, a medical condition that significantly impacts weight (e.g., thyroid conditions), or a
history of bariatric surgery. In addition, participants were not allowed to participate concurrently
in any other type of psychotherapeutic treatment. Concurrent medication use was allowed, as
long as the dosage remained constant throughout treatment. Informed consent was obtained
from all participants for participation in the study, audio-visual recording, and completion of the
measures. All participants received therapy at no cost.
The resultant sample consisted of 59 participants, of whom 97% were Caucasian and 3%
were Hispanic. Ninety-four percent of participants were female. All participants were
outpatients, 18 years of age or older (M: 26.3, SD: 10.5, Range: 18-65), and met criteria for an
eating disorder according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th
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edition, text revision; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Most participants
(89.8%) were diagnosed with bulimia nervosa and eating disorder not otherwise specified.
Remaining participants (9.2%) were diagnosed with anorexia nervosa. These percentages were
consistent with prevalence rates for eating disorders and with sample characteristics in other
studies.
For the purposes of the present study, a subset of participants was excluded from further
analysis. Specifically, because treatment lasted twice as long for individuals diagnosed with
anorexia nervosa, these participants were excluded to ensure that data was gathered when all
clients were at similar points in therapy. The resultant sample comprised 53 participants, 92% of
whom were female. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 65 (M: 25.17, SD: 10.06). Eighty-one
percent were unmarried. All participants were Caucasian.
Attrition and missing data in the original treatment study further reduced the sample size.
Specifically, video recordings of the initial session existed for 50 of the above participants. Of
these, twelve individuals dropped out before the early working phase of treatment, and five more
dropped out before the late working phase of treatment. One individual completed all phases of
treatment, but video recordings were not available beyond the initial session. Thus, levels of
experiencing were obtained for 50 individuals at baseline, 37 individuals at early working phase,
and 32 individuals at late working phase. In addition, five more participants dropped out before
the final session, leaving a total of 27 individuals who completed treatment. All were both
female and Caucausian. Twenty-six were unmarried. Their ages ranged from 18 to 55 (M:
27.67, SD: 10.49).
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Therapists
In the initial treatment study, therapy was conducted by four female Ph.D. candidates in
clinical psychology. All four had received prior training in cognitive behavioral theory and
interventions, and had been practicing cognitive behavioral therapy under supervision for at least
one year. All therapists were trained by Dr. Diane Spangler in the use of the CBT-E treatment
protocol prior to beginning treatment with study clients. This training included seeing pilot
clients until competency in delivering the treatment protocol was reached. While seeing study
clients, therapists received weekly on-site supervision, during which videotaped sessions were
reviewed. In addition, fidelity checks with the treatment protocol were completed by therapists at
the end of each therapy session.
Treatment
Treatment was administered in 20 individual therapy sessions over 20 weeks. Each
session was 50 minutes in length. For the first three weeks, sessions were held twice per week.
For the next 11 weeks, sessions were held once per week. For the last six weeks of treatment,
sessions were held once every two weeks.
Treatment was administered according to Fairburn’s (2008) protocol for Enhanced
Cognitive Behavioral Treatment for Eating Disorders (CBT-E). This protocol is divided into
four stages, each of which focuses on specific aspects of eating disorder symptomatology. Stage
one is focused on reducing and eventually eliminating excessive dietary restriction, binge eating,
and compensatory behaviors. Stage two is focused on assessing changes made in stage one,
identifying any barriers for change, and planning stage three. Stage three is focused on
modifying client dysfunctional beliefs about body shape and weight. Stage four is focused on
maintenance of treatment gains and relapse prevention. The protocol specifies agenda items,
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assessments, and clinical forms to be used at each session. Detailed descriptions of the treatment
protocol are provided by Fairburn (2008). Although treatment closely followed the course and
procedures specified in the manual, effort was also made to tailor the sessions to the specific
needs and symptoms of individual clients.
Measures
Leahy Emotional Schema Scale (LESS). The Leahy Emotional Schema Scale (Leahy,
2002) was designed to assess how clients conceptualize and deal with their feelings and
emotions. It was developed as part of an explicit attempt to integrate an emotion-focused model
of emotional processing with a meta-cognitive model. The LESS is a self-report scale consisting
of 50 items, which are rated on a 6-point Likert scale (1=very untrue of me, 6=very true of me).
Scale items reflect fourteen dimensions related to one’s appraisals of and responses to emotion:
Validation by Others, Comprehensibility, Guilt, Simplistic View of Emotion, Higher Values,
Controllability, Numbness, Demand for Rationality, Duration, Consensus, Acceptance of
Feelings, Rumination, Expression, and Blame. The measure is highly face valid. Although the
LESS is relatively new, correlational studies among clients with depression and anxiety have
supported the views that: (a) emotional expression alone may be insufficient for therapeutic
change, and (b) the greater the degree to which emotional expression facilitates acceptance,
understanding, decreased guilt, and greater differentiation of emotions, the greater the impact on
treatment outcome (Leahy, 2002). In the treatment study, the LESS was administered at intake,
again at the completion of treatment, and once more at six-month follow-up.
For the analyses in the present study, the 14 dimensions of the LESS were divided into
two categories based on Leahy’s (2002) characterizations of each as either promoting or
inhibiting emotional processing. Validation, Comprehensibility, Higher Values, Controllability,
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Consensus, Acceptance of Feelings, and Expression were categorized as “adaptive,” while Guilt,
Simplistic View of Emotions, Numbness, Demand for Rationality, Duration, Rumination, and
Blame were categorized as “maladaptive.” Maladaptive dimensions were reverse-scored for
conceptual clarity; specifically, higher values represented more adaptive approaches to emotional
experience. These scores were regarded as a rough indication of the adaptive value of a given
participant’s views of emotion. Six aggregate LESS scores were then derived for each
participant: pre-treatment total, post-treatment total, pre-treatment adaptive total, pre-treatment
maladaptive total, post-treatment adaptive total, and post-treatment maladaptive total.
Change in Eating Disorder Symptomatology (CHEDS). The Change in Eating
Disorder Symptoms Scale (Spangler, 2010) is a 35-item, comprehensive measure of primary
eating disorder symptomatology. The CHEDS is divided into two subscales. The first measures
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors related to eating, and the second measures thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors related to the body. Previous studies have evaluated the reliability and validity of
the CHEDS with promising findings. The CHEDS was found to consist of seven factors,
identified as: eating concerns/preoccupation, restriction, body preoccupation, body
dissatisfaction, body checking, vomiting, and binge eating. These seven factors accounted for
72% of the variance. Internal reliabilities for the CHEDS factors ranged from .85 to .93, with the
exception of vomiting, which had a reliability of .73. However, it should be noted that this latter
factor consisted of only two items. Internal reliability for the overall scale was shown to be high,
with a coefficient alpha of .96 (Spangler, 2010).
The CHEDS has also demonstrated construct validity in that the subscales correlated in
expected patterns with other measures, discriminant validity in that the scale discriminated
between eating disordered and non-eating disordered groups, and concurrent validity in that the
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scale correlated with other eating disorder measures (Spangler, 2010). In addition, the CHEDS
has been shown to be sensitive to change, with items changing in the theoretically proposed
direction over the course of treatment (Hwang, under review). In the treatment study, the
CHEDS was administered at every treatment and follow-up session. For the present analyses,
the CHEDS was utilized as a measure of post-treatment outcome.
Burns Depression Checklist. The Burns Depression Checklist (BDC; Burns, 1984,
Revised 1996, 1997; See Appendix) assesses symptoms of depression in four categories:
Thoughts and Feelings, Activities and Personal Relationships, Physical Symptoms, and Suicidal
Urges. It is a self-report measure consisting of 25 items, which are rated on a 5-point Likert scale
(0=not at all, 1=somewhat, 2=moderately, 3=a lot, 4=extremely). In the treatment study, the
scale was administered at intake, at session 7, at the completion of treatment, and again at sixmonth follow-up. For present analyses, the BDC was utilized to control for client level of
depression.
The Experiencing (EXP) Scale. The Experiencing (EXP) Scale is a 7-point scale
designed to measure the quality of a client’s working engagement in therapy as rated from
recordings or transcripts of client speech during therapy sessions (Klein et al., 1969). EXP
represents the operationalization of the phenomenological construct of experiencing, and is thus
described as the verbal manifestation of a process of looking inward, finding a felt sense, and
using that felt sense as the referent for exploration and self-analysis. The seven levels of the
scale represent steps in a progression from remote or impersonal communication of personal
subjective experience, through stages of tentative sensing and questioning of subjective feelings,
to fluid communication in which inner referents are a comfortable basis for reflection and
problem resolution. Thus, gradual change from lower to higher stages on the scale represents
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increased awareness of, attention to, and elaboration of felt experience toward the resolution of
significant issues in a client’s life. The stages of the EXP scale may be summarized as follows:
Stage 1: The client provides impersonal, detached, abstract descriptions of events or
ideas. No personal referent is established.
Stage 2: The client’s personal perspective emerges somewhat, such that her interest or
involvement in the narrative is clear, but superficial. The client’s communications do not refer to
or define her feelings.
Stage 3: The client provides clear but limited descriptions of feelings and personal
reactions. Communications of personal interest are confined to behavioral terms and rooted in
external circumstances.
Stage 4: The client communicates directly about feelings and personal experiences.
There is a clear shift to subjective felt sense as the referent, although this sense is not the focus of
purposeful reflection or elaboration.
Stage 5: The content of the client’s communication is exploratory and elaborative relative
to problems or propositions about the self. Exploration is clearly feelings-based, with clear inner
referents that have the potential to expand awareness of in-the-moment experiencing.
Stage 6: The client gains awareness of previously implicit feelings and meanings, with a
felt sense that there is more to what is felt than can be immediately thought or named.
Stage 7: The client’s communication reveals an evolving series of felt senses that emerge
steadily and fluidly. Inner referents are readily attended to and integrated in the present
experiential moment. Felt nuances function as springboards for further exploration and selfunderstanding (stage descriptions adapted from Klein et al., 1986).
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The EXP Scale has been referred to as the “gold standard of good experiential process”
(Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2007, p. 881). It has been extensively studied and validated with
reference to speech fluency, perceptual concreteness, differentiation of cognitive meanings, and
personality (Klein et al., 1986). As noted, high EXP ratings have been shown to predict
therapeutic gain across theoretical orientations. The reliability of the scale has been evaluated
relative to such variables as sampling procedure, rater sophistication, segment length, and mode
of training. Reported interrater reliability coefficients range from .76 to .91, with reported ratererate coefficients of .80 (Klein et al., 1986). The Experiencing Scale was used to code
videotapes of sessions obtained from the aforementioned treatment study. Resultant scores were
utilized as a measure of integrated cognitive-affective processing.
Procedure
Rater selection. Five potential raters were recruited from among research assistants in
Diane Spangler’s lab. As per guidelines in the EXP Scale manual (Klein et al., 1969), screening
criteria for potential raters included: (a) Sophomore standing or above, (b) Major in the
humanities or social sciences, (c) Commitment to specified number of hours per week, (d) GPA
of 3.0 or higher. A personal interview represented the last phase before selection. Working
policies addressed during the interview included: (a) agreement to participate through the entire
training period, (b) understanding that the final selection of raters would be made at the end of
training based on ability to use the scale, (c) acceptance of work schedule, including expected
number of hours per week (5-10) and specification of limits on time spent in a single rating
session (minimum: 30 minutes, maximum: 2 hours without a 10-15 minute break), (d) agreement
to receive minimal information regarding research design and use of the scale until the close of
the project, and (e) agreement to participate in on-going review and re-orientation sessions.
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The psychological sophistication, verbal skills, discretion, and maturity of raters were
considered. Particular attention was devoted to issues of confidentiality, and prospective raters
signed a copy of the Code of Ethics included in the EXP Scale manual.
Rater training. Raters were trained on the Experiencing Scales according to the manual
published by the authors (Klein et al., 1969). Training took place during eight 2-hour sessions,
each of which involved rating 10 practice segments. Ratings were compared with criterion
ratings and justifications provided by the authors of the scale. At the end of training, rater
reliabilities were computed for a block of 20 segments. Reliabilities for modal and peak ratings
were calculated, and the three raters who achieved reliability with the expert ratings of .8 or
higher were selected to code the sessions for the study. In order to address potential rater drift
once coding for the study had begun, all raters re-read the scale, re-rated selected practice
segments, and re-read the justifications provided on a bi-weekly basis. Ultimately, the two raters
who achieved the highest reliability were used for the analyses.
Selection of sessions. In the absence of reliable information regarding trends in
experiencing for an eating disorder population, and in order to minimize variability due to
treatment stage, treatment dosage, and other associated variables, it was determined that
segments from common points in therapy should be coded for each client. Based on Dr. Diane
Spangler’s knowledge of the treatment protocol, as well as her familiarity with the arc of
treatment from supervising the therapists, sessions 0, 12, and 16 were selected as those to be
rated. Because session 0 consists of an assessment interview prior to the beginning of the
treatment proper, ratings of clients’ answers to open-ended questions during this session were
viewed as providing an indication of baseline experiencing without the potentially confounding
influence of treatment effects. Thus, along with pre-treatment LESS scores, these ratings
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provided an indication as to clients’ general approach to cognitive-affective processing,
including their ability, willingness, and tendency to engage in exploration of emotional
experience in a help-seeking context.
Segments from sessions 12 and 16 were coded because these sessions fall in phase 3 of
CBT-E, during which the focus is on modifying clients’ dysfunctional beliefs about body shape
and weight. It is likely that clients were dealing more directly with personally significant issues
than in those sessions devoted to psychoeducation or treatment planning. Therefore, the
experiencing level of clients might be expected to change or reach deeper levels as a function of
the techniques employed at this point in the treatment protocol. The decision to code these
sessions is also consistent with prior research suggesting that EXP ratings during the working
phase of treatment are most predictive of outcome (Klein et al., 1986; Pos et al., 2009). Because
session 12 falls a few sessions into treatment phase 3, it is likely that preliminary education and
introductions to new treatment elements had been completed, and the focus was on real
therapeutic “work.” Similarly, session 16 falls one session prior to the conclusion of treatment
phase 3, providing a second time point within the working phase of therapy. In the event that a
session was not recorded or was lost due to technical difficulties, a contiguous session was coded
(i.e., if session 12 was missing, session 13 was coded; if session 16 was missing, session 15 was
coded). Session 12 (or 13) was designated “early working phase,” and session 15 (or 16) was
designated “late working phase.”
Selection of segments. There is evidence that EXP ratings of brief segments are
representative of experiencing across a full hour of therapy, with ratings of 4-, 6-, and 8-minute
segments corresponding to ratings of the entire session (Kiesler, Mathieu, & Klein, 1964). It was
determined that 8-minute segments would be rated in order to best represent the range of
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experiencing in the sample. In the absence of data regarding trends in EXP over the course of a
therapy hour for CBT-E, it was determined that segments would be drawn from various time
points across the selected sessions. It was further reasoned that this sampling procedure might
provide some indication as to moments in CBT-E during which internal felt experience is likely
to become the basis for communication and self-understanding. Given that the beginning and
end of each session generally involved logistical aspects of treatment, such as “checking in,”
setting agendas, reporting on homework, and assigning new homework, it was determined that
the first five minutes and the last five minutes of each session would not be rated. Eight-minute
segments were thus drawn from the remaining 40 minutes of the selected sessions. To minimize
the confounding effects of time, a random start point within the selected sessions was used.
Rating procedures. Segments were rated according to procedures in previous research.
Raters summarized their ratings by two scores: a modal rating characterizing the average (most
frequently occurring) scale level of the segment, and a peak rating representing the highest scale
level reached within the segment. For segments in which these distinctions were unclear, modal
and peak ratings were distinguished according to guidelines provided by the authors of the scale.
Data analysis. Interrater reliability was evaluated using an intraclass correlation (ICC)
with raters as a fixed factor. ICCs at each of the three time points were .58, .67, and .81 for
modal ratings, and .61, .67, and .80 for peak ratings. These results indicate questionable
reliability for ratings of baseline EXP, acceptable reliability for ratings of early working phase
EXP, and good reliability for late working phase EXP. Descriptive statistics were calculated for
in-session experiencing across participants and point in treatment (Aim 1). Bivariate correlation
analyses were used to examine relationships between variables without distinction between
independent and dependent variables.
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To evaluate whether depth of experiencing predicted treatment outcome, a number of
regression analyses were performed. First, a regression was calculated with total post-treatment
CHEDS score as the outcome variable and baseline EXP as the predictor, controlling for age,
BMI, baseline depression (pre-treatment BDC), baseline eating disorder symptomatology (pretreatment CHEDS), and initial views of emotion (pre-treatment LESS). Regressions were then
calculated using early working phase EXP and late working phase EXP as predictors, controlling
for age, BMI, baseline depression, baseline eating disorder symptomatology, initial views of
emotion, and baseline level of experiencing.
These analyses were then repeated using more narrowly specified outcome variables,
namely post-treatment scores on the two CHEDS subscales (eating-related thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors; body-related thoughts, feelings, and behaviors), and using change in EXP (from
baseline to early and late working phases) as the predictor variable. All analyses used the
average rating of each segment across raters. Modal and peak ratings were analyzed separately
(Aim 2).
To evaluate whether views of emotion moderated a relationship between EXP and
outcome, the above analyses were repeated with baseline LESS score as both a main effect and
as an interaction with the EXP variable. The interaction term was the primary test of the
moderation effect (Aim 3).
It should be noted that the sample size for regression analyses was limited by attrition and
missing data in the initial treatment study. Specifically, of the 50 participants for whom video
recordings were available, only 27 completed treatment. Among these, nine were missing pretreatment data for BMI, BDC score, LESS score, and/or CHEDS score. Under a listwise
deletion approach to missing data, this meant that regression analyses utilizing post-treatment
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CHEDS scores were limited to 18 observations. Results were thus compared against bivariate
correlations and the results of models in which missing values were dropped or substituted with
means.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents aggregated means, standard deviations, and ranges for control variables
(age, pre-treatment BMI, pre-treatment depression, pre-treatment eating disorder
symptomatology, initial views of emotion) and outcome variables (post-treatment eating disorder
symptomatology). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for levels of EXP at each of the three
time points. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for change in EXP from baseline to the early
working phase of treatment and from baseline to the late working phase of treatment.
Table 1
Summary of Control and Outcome Variables
Variable

n

M (SD)

Min

Max

Age

53

25.17 (10.06)

18

BMI

47

25.14 (8.70)

0

BDC

29

47.97 (18.48)

14

82

LESS

44

2.59 (3.32)

-8.61

8.53

Total

48

94.65 (20.85)

41

127

Body Subscale

49

54.12 (10.99)

21

71

Eating Subscale

51

41.22 (11.56)

10

61

Total

27

33.41 (24.05)

0

86

Body Subscale

28

21.32 (14.70)

0

52

Eating Subscale

27

12.26 (10.06)

0

34

65
52.8

Pre-Treatment CHEDS

Post-Treatment CHEDS

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema
Scale, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder Symptomatology.
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Table 2
Summary of EXP Ratings
Time Point

n

M (SD)

Min

Max

Modal

50

2.36 (0.58)

2

4

Peak

50

2.45 (0.63)

2

4

Modal

37

2.95 (0.84)

1.5

5

Peak

37

2.96 (0.84)

2

5

Modal

32

3.00 (0.94)

1

5

Peak

32

3.03 (0.92)

1

5

Baseline

Early Working Phase

Late Working Phase

Note. EXP = The Experiencing Scale.

Table 3
Summary of Change in EXP Across Sessions
Treatment Interval

n

M (SD)

Min

Max

Baseline to Early Working Phase
Modal

37

0.58 (0.98)

-2

2.5

Peak

37

0.53 (1.05)

-1.5

2.5

Modal

32

0.64 (0.94)

-1

2.5

Peak

32

0.67 (0.93)

-1

2.5

Baseline to Late Working Phase

Note. EXP = The Experiencing Scale.

Levels of experiencing. It was predicted that client experiencing would be present in the
rated sessions, with variability among clients and across phases of therapy. The first part of this
hypothesis was satisfied. However, mean values of EXP were typically low and ranged only
from 2.36 (SD = .58) to 3.03 (SD = .92). This restricted range of EXP scores diminished the
likelihood of detecting potential relationships between EXP and other variables, particularly
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given the relatively small sample size. Results of subsequent analyses should thus be considered
in light of the finding that EXP in the sample occurred with limited variability.
Relationship of EXP to Outcome
Correlations. Correlational analyses were conducted to investigate relationships
between modal and peak ratings of EXP, treatment outcome (CHEDS total score, CHEDS Body
Subscale score, and CHEDS Eating Subscale score), and views of emotion (pre-treatment LESS
score). There was no significant correlation between post-treatment CHEDS and level of EXP at
any of the three time points, indicating that depth of experiencing was not associated with posttreatment eating symptomatology. Nor were correlations observed between pre-treatment LESS
score and levels of EXP, indicating that clients who initially endorsed more positive views of
emotion were not more likely to reach deeper levels of experiencing. In addition, there were no
significant correlations between pre-treatment LESS score and post-treatment CHEDS scores,
suggesting that initial views of emotion were not associated with post-treatment eating
symptomatology. These results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4
Summary of Intercorrelations for Modal Ratings of EXP, CHEDS Scores, and LESS Scores
Variable

1

2

3

4

5

1. EXP Time 1

-

2. EXP Time 2

0.08

-

3. EXP Time 3

0.32

0.26

4. CHEDS Total

0.17

-0.17

-0.24

-

5. CHEDS Body Subscale

0.06

-0.23

-0.28

0.97***

-

6. CHEDS Eating Subscale

0.31

-0.05

-0.15

0.94***

0.84***

7. LESS

0.00

0.21

0.08

-0.28

-0.37

6

7

-

-0.13

Note. EXP = The Experiencing Scale, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder Symptomatology, LESS =
Leahy Emotional Schema Scale.
***p < .001

-
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Table 5
Summary of Intercorrelations for Peak Ratings of EXP, CHEDS Scores, and LESS Scores
Variable
1. EXP Time 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

-

2. EXP Time 2

-0.02

-

3. EXP Time 3

0.27

0.23

-

4. CHEDS Total

0.20

-0.20

-0.26

-

5. CHEDS Body Subscale

0.10

-0.25

-0.31

0.97***

-

6. CHEDS Eating Subscale

0.32

-0.09

-0.16

0.94***

0.84***

7. LESS

0.03

0.19

0.11

-0.36

-0.13

-0.28

-

Note. EXP = The Experiencing Scale, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder Symptomatology, LESS =
Leahy Emotional Schema Scale.
***p < .001

Bivariate correlations did suggest an association between change in EXP and outcome.
Specifically, change in EXP from baseline to the late working phase of treatment was moderately
correlated with post-treatment CHEDS total score (Modal: r = -.46, p = 0.02; Peak: r = -.48, p =
.02), post-treatment CHEDS Body Subscale score (Modal: r = -.41, p = .04; Peak: r = -.43, p =
.03), and post-treatment CHEDS Eating Subscale score (Modal: r = -.46, p = .02; Peak: r = -.47,
p = .02). Consistent with study hypotheses, these results suggested that individuals whose levels
of experiencing increased from baseline to the late working phase of treatment were more likely
to endorse lower levels of eating psychopathology at the end of treatment. Nonetheless, given the
small sample size and the finding that EXP and outcome were otherwise uncorrelated, these
results should be interpreted with caution. Correlations between change in EXP and outcome
variables are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
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Table 6
Summary of Intercorrelations for Change in Modal Ratings of EXP and CHEDS Scores
Variable

1

1. ΔEXP: Baseline to Early Working Phase

-

2. ΔEXP: Baseline to Late Working Phase

0.34

2

3

4

5

-

3. CHEDS Total

-0.24

-0.46*

-

4. CHEDS Body Subscale

-0.22

-0.41*

0.97***

-

5. CHEDS Eating Subscale

-0.24

-0.46*

0.94***

0.84***

-

Note. EXP = The Experiencing Scale, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder Symptomatology.
*p < .05, ***p < .001

Table 7
Summary of Intercorrelations for Change in Peak Ratings of EXP and CHEDS Scores
Variable

1

1. ΔEXP: Baseline to Early Working Phase

-

2. ΔEXP: Baseline to Late Working Phase

0.34

2

3

4

5

-

3. CHEDS Total

-0.32

-0.48*

-

4. CHEDS Body Subscale

-0.29

-0.43*

0.97***

-

5. CHEDS Eating Subscale

-0.29

-0.47*

0.94***

0.84***

-

Note. EXP = The Experiencing Scale, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder Symptomatology.
*p < .05, ***p < .001

In additional exploratory analyses, a moderate positive correlation was found between
baseline modal EXP and post-treatment LESS score, r = .51, p = .006, indicating that clients who
reached deeper levels of experiencing at baseline were more likely to endorse positive views of
emotion at the end of treatment. Late working phase EXP was also significantly related to posttreatment LESS score, with moderate positive correlations for both modal ratings, r = .43, p =
.03, and peak ratings, r = .46, p = .02. These results suggest that clients who reached deeper
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levels of experiencing during the late working phase of treatment were more likely to endorse
positive views of emotion at the end of treatment.
Regression analyses. A primary aim of this study was to examine the influence of depth
of experiencing on treatment outcome. To address this aim, a series of regression analyses was
conducted, where post-treatment CHEDS score was regressed on observer-rated level of EXP.
Contrary to hypotheses, results generally suggested that level of experiencing did not predict
post-treatment outcome.
As noted above, regression analyses in the study were based on a limited number of
observations, which limited the potential to detect relationships among variables. Indeed, despite
a general lack of significance, R2 values tended to be high, indicating that the models were likely
too complicated for the amount of available data. Nonetheless, given that bivariate correlations
showed no significant relationship between post-treatment CHEDS and depth of EXP at any
stage of treatment, it appears that the lack of an observed relationship in the regression models
was not due solely to the limited amount of data. Because analyses yielded similar results when
missing values were dropped or substituted with mean values, the results presented below are
based on the 18 complete case observations.
First, total post-treatment CHEDS score was regressed on baseline EXP, controlling for
age, pre-treatment BMI, pre-treatment depression, baseline symptomatology, and initial views of
emotion. Then total post-treatment CHEDS score was regressed on early working phase EXP
and on late working phase EXP, controlling for baseline EXP, age, pre-treatment BMI, pretreatment depression, baseline symptomatology, and initial views of emotion. None of these
analyses yielded statistically significant results, suggesting that level of EXP did not predict
overall post-treatment outcome. These results are summarized in Tables 8, 9, and 10.
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Table 8
Regression of CHEDS Total Score by Baseline EXP
Modal
Modal
Variable

b

Peak
95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

-0.519

[-99.34, 98.30]

1.293

[-101.13, 103.72]

Age

-1.109

[-2.97, 0.74]

-1.023

[-2.92, 0.88]

BMI

1.599

[-0.34, 3.53]

1.507

[-0.49, 3.51]

BDC

-0.605

[-1.42, 0.21]

-0.631

[-1.45, -0.19]

Pre-treatment CHEDS

0.232

[-0.51, 0.98]

0.250

[-0.51, 1.01]

LESS

1.168

[-3.39, 5.72]

1.251

[-3.38, 5.88]

EXP Time 1

9.595

[-7.86, 27.05]

8.541

[-9.78, 26.87]

R2

0.38

0.40

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.

Table 9
Regression of CHEDS Total Score by Early Working Phase EXP
Modal
Modal
Variable

Peak

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

-1.438

[-113.54, 110.66]

1.322

[-114.15, 116.79]

Age

-1.058

[-3.28, 1.16]

-0.938

[-3.20, 0.37]

BMI

1.589

[-0.62, 3.80]

1.462

[-0.84, 3.76]

BDC

-0.575

[-1.53, 0.38]

-0.592

[-1.55, 0.37]

Pre-treatment CHEDS

0.274

[-0.64, 1.19]

0.307

[-0.61, 1.22]

LESS

1.533

[-4.50, 7.56]

1.724

[-4.17, 7.61]

EXP Time 1

9.702

[-10.40, 29.81]

8.682

[-12.35, 29.72]

EXP Time 2

-1.917

[-20.52, 16.69]

-2.876

[-20.60, 14.85]

R2

0.40

0.38

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.
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Table 10
Regression of CHEDS Total Score by Late Working Phase EXP
Modal
Variable

Peak

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

0.722

[-90.70, 92.14]

0.120

[-97.65, 97.89]

Age

-0.779

[-2.55, 0.99]

-0.704

[-2.58, 1.17]

BMI

1.639

[-0.15, 3.43]

1.484

[-0.42, 3.39]

BDC

-0.546

[-1.30, 0.21]

-0.558

[-1.35, 0.23]

Pre-treatment CHEDS

0.172

[-0.52, 0.87]

0.234

[-0.49, 0.96]

LESS

1.679

[-2.58, 5.94]

1.925

[-2.60, 6.45]

EXP Time 1

19.617

[-0.82, 40.05]

16.81

[-4.38, 37.99]

EXP Time 3

-13.463

[-30.30, 3.37]

-11.74

[-28.71, 5.23]

Constant

R2

0.55

0.50

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.

Analyses were then repeated utilizing each of the CHEDS subscales as the outcome
variable. Analyses that used CHEDS Body Subscale score did not yield significant results for
EXP at any stage of treatment. Analyses that used CHEDS Eating Subscale score did not yield
significant results when baseline EXP or early working phase EXP were used as the predictor.
When CHEDS Eating Subscale score was regressed on late working phase EXP, the overall
model was significant (Modal: Adjusted R2 = .48, F(7, 10) = 3.24, p = .045, Peak: Adjusted R2 =
.47, F(7, 10) = 3.14, p = .0498); however, the regression coefficient for late working phase EXP
was not significant for either modal or peak ratings.
Thus, taken together, results of regression analyses utilizing the CHEDS subscale scores
as a measure of outcome suggested that depth of experiencing did not predict change in bodyrelated symptomatology or eating-related symptomatology. Results of analyses using the
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Table 11
Regression of CHEDS Body Subscale Score by Baseline EXP
Modal
Variable

b

Peak
95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

15.911

[-44.95, 76.77]

18.793

[-43.38, 80.96]

Age

-0.694

[-1.86, 0.47]

-0.674

[-1.85, 0.51]

BMI

0.930

[-0.35, 2.21]

0.908

[-0.40, 2.22]

BDC

-0.336

[-0.84, 0.16]

-0.347

[-0.85, 0.16]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Body Subscale

0.102

[-0.60, 0.80]

0.101

[-0.61, 0.81]

LESS

-0.248

[-3.10, 2.60]

-0.232

[-3.11, 2.65]

EXP Time 1

3.486

[-7.99, 14.96]

2.522

[-9.46, 14.51]

R2

0.33

0.56

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.

Table 12
Regression of CHEDS Body Subscale Score by Early Working Phase EXP
Modal
Variable

Peak

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

15.947

[-53.22, 85.12]

18.932

[-51.78, 89.64]

Age

-0.703

[-2.08, 0.67]

-0.661

[-2.06, 0.74]

BMI

0.933

[-0.53, 2.40]

0.901

[-0.61, 2.41]

BDC

-0.342

[-0.95, 0.27]

-0.341

[-0.95, 0.27]

0.091

[-0.77, 0.95]

0.112

[-0.75, 0.97]

-0.311

[-4.06, 3.44]

-0.174

[-3.84, 3.49]

EXP Time 1

3.424

[-9.90, 16.74]

2.590

[-11.30, 16.48]

EXP Time 2

0.401

[-11.81, 12.61]

-0.437

[-12.06, 11.18]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Body Subscale
LESS

R2

0.32

0.31

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.
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Table 13
Regression of CHEDS Body Subscale Score by Late Working Phase EXP
Modal
Variable

b

Peak
95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

13.102

[-43.18, 69.38]

15.830

[-44.01, 75.68]

Age

-0.448

[-1.56, 0.67]

-0.459

[-1.64, 0.72]

BMI

0.960

[-0.22, 2.14]

0.899

[-0.36, 2.16]

BDC

-0.314

[-0.78, 0.15]

-0.309

[-0.79, 0.18]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Body Subscale

0.097

[-0.55, 0.74]

0.119

[-0.56, 0.80]

LESS

0.188

[-2.50, 2.88]

0.251

[-2.61, 3.11]

EXP Time 1

10.060

[-3.31, 23.43]

7.822

[-6.14, 21.78]

EXP Time 3

-8.827

[-19.77, 2.11]

-7.453

[-18.57, 3.66]

R2

0.49

0.44

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.

Table 14
Regression of CHEDS Eating Subscale Score by Baseline EXP
Modal
Variable

Peak

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

-18.506

[-49.26, 12.24]

-19.530

[-51.27, 12.21]

Age

-0.278

[-0.97, 0.41]

-0.208

[-0.91, 0.49]

BMI

0.593

[-0.07, 1.26]

0.519

[-0.16, 1.20]

BDC

-0.318*

[-0.61, -0.02]

-0.332*

[-0.63, -0.04]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Eating Subscale

0.504

[-0.06, 1.07]

0.542

[-0.03, 1.11]

LESS

1.575*

[0.01, 3.14]

1.636*

[0.06, 3.21]

EXP Time 1

5.600

[-0.39, 11.59]

5.591

[-0.61, 11.79]

Constant

R2

0.63

0.62

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
*p < .05
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Table 15
Regression of CHEDS Eating Subscale Score by Early Working Phase EXP
Modal
Variable

Peak

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

-17.737

[-51.23, 15.76]

-17.773

[-52.38, 16.83]

Age

-0.217

[-1.00, 0.57]

-0.145

[-0.93, 0.64]

BMI

0.566

[-0.17, 1.30]

0.476

[-0.28, 1.23]

BDC

-0.282

[-0.61, 0.05]

-0.297

[-0.63, 0.03]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Eating Subscale

0.576

[-0.06, 1.22]

0.611

[-0.02, 1.25]

LESS

1.937*

[0.02, 3.86]

1.972*

[0.10, 3.84]

EXP Time 1

5.610

[-0.98, 12.20]

5.533

[-52.38, 16.83]

EXP Time 2

-2.053

[-7.88, 3.77]

-2.145

[-7.70, 3.40]

R2

0.66

0.65

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
*p < .05

Table 16
Regression of CHEDS Eating Subscale Score by Late Working Phase EXP
Modal
Variable

Peak

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

-16.783

[-46.49, 12.92]

-18.551

[-49.17, 12.07]

Age

-0.215

[-0.89, 0.46]

-0.128

[-0.81, 0.55]

BMI

0.620

[-0.02, 1.26]

0.519

[-0.14, 1.18]

BDC

-0.285

[-0.57, 0.00]

-0.298*

[-0.59, -0.01]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Eating Subscale

0.420

[-0.14, 0.98]

0.493

[-0.06, 1.05]

LESS

1.670*

[0.15, 3.18]

1.809*

[0.27, 3.35]

EXP Time 1

8.709*

[-46.49, 12.92]

8.328*

[1.04, 15.61]

[-10.14, 2.06]

-3.845

[-9.70, 2.01]

Constant

EXP Time 3
R

2

-4.036
0.69

0.69

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
*p < .05
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CHEDS Body Subscale are summarized in Tables 11-13. Results of analyses using the CHEDS
Eating Subscale are summarized in Tables 14-16.
A third set of regression analyses was used to investigate whether outcome was predicted
by change in EXP from baseline to the early working phase of treatment and/or from baseline to
the late working phase of treatment. Analyses were calculated for total CHEDS score and for
each of the CHEDS subscales. Bivariate correlations had suggested an association between
increases in EXP from baseline to late working phase and decreases in post-treatment CHEDS
scores. However, none of the models utilizing change in EXP as the predictor variable yielded
statistically significant results, indicating that change in experiencing from baseline to the
working phase of treatment did not predict post-treatment eating disorder symptomatology.
These results are summarized in Tables 17-22.
Table 17
Regression of CHEDS Total Score by Change in EXP from Baseline to Early Working Phase
Modal
Variable

b

Peak
95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

10.143

[-90.99, 111.28]

11.813

[-88.05, 111.68]

Age

-0.948

[-3.05, 1.15]

-0.903

[-3.04, 1.23]

BMI

1.593

[-0.53, 3.71]

1.497

[-0.68, 3.67]

BDC

-0.579

[-1.50, 0.34]

-0.592

[-1.50, 0.32]

Pre-treatment CHEDS

0.341

[-0.51, 1.19]

0.341

[-0.51, 1.20]

LESS

2.189

[-3.21, 7.59]

2.109

[-3.23, 7.44]

∆ EXP

-5.461

[-19.39, 8.47]

-5.232

[-18.70, 8.23]

R2

0.37

0.37

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.
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Table 18
Regression of CHEDS Total Score by Change in EXP from Baseline to Late Working Phase
Modal
Variable

b

Peak
95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

16.588

[-61.87, 95.05]

13.583

[-64.72, 91.89]

Age

-0.748

[-2.47, 0.97]

-0.819

[-2.51, 0.87]

BMI

1.697

[-0.04, 3.43]

1.742*

[0.02, 3.47]

BDC

-0.594

[-1.32, 0.13]

-0.543

[-2.51, 0.87]

Pre-treatment CHEDS

0.162

[-0.51, 0.84]

0.186

[-0.48, 0.85]

LESS

1.809

[-2.32, 5.94]

1.994

[-2.14, 6.12]

∆ EXP

-15.059

[-30.89, 0.77]

-14.79

[-29.95, 0.37]

R2

0.52

0.52

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
*p < .05

Table 19
Regression of CHEDS Body Subscale by Change in EXP from Baseline to Early Working Phase
Modal
Variable

b

Peak
95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

22.929

[-36.11, 81.96]

23.330

[-34.48, 81.14]

Age

-0.668

[-1.96, 0.63]

-0.656

[-1.97, 0.66]

BMI

0.941

[-0.45, 2.33]

0.916

[-0.50, 2.33]

BDC

-0.336

[-0.91, 0.24]

-0.339

[-0.91, 0.23]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Body Subscale

0.125

[-0.68, 0.93]

0.125

[-0.67, 0.92]

LESS

-0.032

[-3.40, 3.33]

-0.048

[-3.36, 3.26]

∆ EXP

-1.313

[-10.52, 7.89]

-1.298

[-10.14, 7.55]

R2

0.30

0.30

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.
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Table 20
Regression of CHEDS Body Subscale by Change in EXP from Baseline to Late Working Phase
Modal
Variable

b

Peak
95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

16.459

[-28.63, 61.55]

15.395

[-30.36, 61.15]

Age

-0.441

[-1.49, 0.61]

-0.499

[-1.54, 0.55]

BMI

0.970

[-0.14, 2.08]

0.999

[-0.12, 2.12]

BDC

-0.324

[-0.75, 0.11]

-0.292

[-0.50, 0.72]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Body Subscale

0.091

[-0.51, 0.70]

0.108

[-0.50, 0.72]

LESS

0.210

[-2.32, 2.74]

0.292

[-2.28, 2.86]

∆ EXP

-9.141

[-19.14, 0.85]

-8.691

[-18.44, 1.06]

R2

0.48

0.49

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
None of the effects were significant.

Table 21
Regression of CHEDS Eating Subscale by Change in EXP from Baseline to Early Working Phase
Modal
Variable

Peak

b

95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

-12.170

[-42.41, 18.07]

-11.49

[-7.81, 0.86]

Age

-0.151

[-0.90, 0.60]

-0.114

[-0.88, 0.65]

BMI

0.555

[-0.16, 1.27]

0.488

[-0.25, 1.22]

BDC

-0.290

[-0.61, 0.03]

-0.301

[-0.62, 0.02]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Eating Subscale

0.646*

[0.04, 1.25]

0.657*

[0.05, 1.27]

LESS

2.232*

[0.48, 3.99]

2.195*

[0.45, 3.94]

∆ EXP

-3.589

[-8.07, 0.89]

-3.472

[-7.81, 0.86]

R2

0.62

0.62

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
*p < .05
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Table 22
Regression of CHEDS Eating Subscale by Change in EXP from Baseline to Late Working Phase
Modal
Variable

b

Peak
95% CI

b

95% CI

Constant

-6.332

[-34.96, 22.29]

-7.296

[-35.05, 20.46]

Age

-0.174

[-0.89, 0.55]

-0.191

[-0.89, 0.50]

BMI

0.661

[-0.03, 1.35]

0.676*

[0.01, 1.34]

BDC

-0.332*

[-0.63, -0.03]

-0.309*

[-0.61, -0.01]

Pre-treatment CHEDS
Eating Subscale

0.442

[-0.16, 1.04]

0.450

[-0.13, 1.03]

LESS

1.814*

[0.19, 3.43]

1.887*

[0.31, 3.46]

∆ EXP

-5.170

R2

[-11.55, 1.21]
0.60

-5.472

[-11.40, 0.46]
0.63

Note. BMI = Body Mass Index, BDC = Beck Depression Checklist, CHEDS = Change in Eating Disorder
Symptomatology, LESS = Leahy Emotional Schema Scale, EXP = The Experiencing Scale.
*p < .05

A final aim of the study was to investigate whether views of emotion moderated the
relationship between EXP and outcome. As noted, previous analyses indicated no relationship
for views of emotion to moderate. Nonetheless, this aim was addressed by repeating the
regression analyses with baseline LESS score included both as a main effect and as an
interaction with the EXP variable. The interaction term was the primary test of the moderation
effect.
Analyses that included the interaction of EXP and pre-treatment LESS score and used
CHEDS total score as the outcome variable did not yield significant results, regardless of
whether baseline EXP, early working phase EXP, or late working phase EXP was used as the
predictor. Likewise, analyses that included the interaction of EXP and pre-treatment LESS score
and used CHEDS Body Subscale score as the outcome variable did not yield significant results
for EXP at any stage of treatment.
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Analyses that included the interaction of EXP and pre-treatment LESS score and used
CHEDS Eating subscale score as the outcome variable did not yield significant results when
baseline EXP and early working phase EXP were used as the predictor. However, when CHEDS
Eating Subscale score was regressed by late working phase EXP, with the interaction term
included, the overall model was significant for both modal and peak ratings (Modal: Adjusted R2
= .58, F(8, 9) = 3.94, p = .03, Peak: Adjusted R2 = .58, F(8, 9) = 3.95, p = .03). The regression
coefficients (b) for late working phase EXP were also significant for both modal and peak ratings
(Modal: b = -6.482, p = .046, Peak: b = -6.647, p = .039). Nonetheless, the regression coefficient
for the interaction term was not significant for either modal or peak ratings of EXP, suggesting
that, consistent with the above analyses, views of emotion did not moderate a relationship
between late working phase EXP and post-treatment score on the CHEDS Eating Subscale.
Discussion
Results of the present study generally suggested no significant association between client
experiencing and post-treatment outcome. There were glimpses of a relationship, particularly
negative bivariate correlations between change in EXP and post-treatment CHEDS scores.
Nonetheless, regression analyses suggested that neither depth of experiencing nor change in
depth of experiencing predicted post-treatment eating symptomatology. Such results run counter
both to study hypotheses and to previous research suggesting that deeper levels of experiencing
are associated with positive treatment outcomes. However, it appears likely that analyses were
affected by limited variability in the sample. Specifically, the restricted range of EXP scores
may have limited the statistical detection of a potential relationship, particularly given the
relatively small sample size. This restricted range, although unfortunate, was somewhat
anticipated given the nature of the sample and the treatment protocol used in the study.
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A number of factors may have contributed to the restricted range of experiencing in the
study. First, the range of experiencing may have been restricted due to aforementioned
processing difficulties associated with eating disorders (Bydlowski et al., 2005; Taylor et al.,
1996). From this perspective, participants in the current study may have been less willing and/or
able to engage in—let alone articulate—the sort of integrated cognitive-emotional processing
described by the experiencing construct.
The sampling procedure used in the study introduces a second set of factors that may
have contributed to the restricted range of EXP scores. The rationale for applying a random
sampling procedure has been previously described; however, it is possible that this procedure
missed moments of significant emotional processing that took place during the study. For
instance, it has been suggested that experiential processing over the course of cognitive
behavioral treatment may take place outside the therapy sessions, while clients are engaged in
homework assignments and other between-session activities (Boswell, 2011; Castonguay et al.,
1996). It has also been noted that this between-session processing may be particularly likely
when homework involves observation and analysis of thoughts, feelings, and behavior (Samoilov
& Goldfried, 2000). Given that such homework assignments were initiated at the outset of CBTE, continued throughout treatment, and emphasized as equal in importance with client attendance
of the sessions (Fairburn, 2008), it may be that treatment promoted between- rather than insession experiencing for the clients in this study.
Research on the verbal content of experiencing suggests another possible sampling issue.
Goldman, Greenberg, and Pos (2005) found that experiencing was most strongly associated with
outcome in experiential therapy for depression when clients were expressing emotion related to
core themes of their treatment. These themes were related to specific intrapersonal and
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interpersonal experiences, such as conflict between critical and vulnerable aspects of the self,
feelings of hopelessness about the future, or unresolved anger toward a spouse or child
(Goldman et al., 2005). Given that such themes were not identified or incorporated into the
design of the current study, it may that a more selective sampling procedure, which focused on
the idiosyncratic experiences of each client, would have yielded more relevant instances of
verbal expression to be rated on the EXP scale.
The restricted range of experiencing in the study may also reflect conceptual difficulties
stemming from limitations of the definition and/or operationalization of the construct. For
instance, the EXP Scale deliberately focuses on verbal communications for the sake of reliability
(Klein et al., 1986); however, it is clear that other non-verbal and physiological aspects of
expression may be relevant (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999). It may be that emphasis on
verbal expression in the rated segments missed other potential indicators of cognitive-affective
processing, such as vocal, facial, and postural displays. Indeed, there have been efforts to
develop more inclusive measures of emotional processing, such as the Client Emotional
Productivity Scale (Greenberg, Auszra, & Herrmann, 2007), which assesses both verbal and nonverbal elements of client communication, including content of speech, tone of voice, facial
expression, gesture, and other physical movement. The use of such a measure in the present
study may have yielded more variability in the coded sessions.
Along similar lines, it may be that the descriptions of stages and markers on the
Experiencing Scale too narrowly reflect the theories, processes, and techniques of the humanistic
and person-centered traditions in which they were developed. From this perspective, although
experiencing is generally regarded as a common factor across therapeutic approaches, it might be
more adequately investigated in CBT using measures that reflect cognitive approaches to theory
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and research. For instance, the Change and Growth Experiences Scale (CGES), subtitled A
Measure of Insight and Emotional Processing (A. M. Hayes, Feldman, & Goldfried, 2007),
represents an attempt to incorporate ideas from across psychotherapy literatures, including
notions of emotional processing and meaning-making, as well as cognitive distortion and schema
change. As noted by the authors, this integrative approach maps imperfectly onto past research,
requiring modified designations for constructs of interest (e.g., the distinction of insightprocessing from emotional processing); therefore, associated measures might be regarded as
supplements to, rather than replacements for, the Experiencing Scale (A. M. Hayes et al., 2007).
Nonetheless, with regard to the present study, it is possible that use of the CGES, or a similarly
integrative measure, might have yielded more nuanced or conceptually consistent results relative
to cognitive-affective processing in CBT-E.
The notion of conceptual differences underlines a crucial fourth consideration: the
restricted range of emotional experiencing may reflect the cognitive-behavioral emphases of the
treatment protocol at both theoretical and practical levels (Fairburn, 2008, p. 12). The CBT-E
protocol defines the psychopathology of eating disorders as “essentially cognitive” in nature
(Fairburn, 2008, p. 12), and outlines the process of recovery as the establishment of more
realistic, balanced, and accurate ways of thinking about shape, weight, and self-worth (Fairburn,
2008). Accordingly, interventions (e.g., psychoeducation, exploratory questioning, and
analyzing the effects of strategic behavior changes) are implemented toward the explicit goal of
producing change at a cognitive level (Fairburn, 2008, p. 96). Insofar as such interventions
engender an attitude of intellectual curiosity and objective rational analysis, they would not be
expected to promote deep experiencing during treatment sessions. This notion is consistent with
available evidence suggesting that emotional experience is less emphasized in CBT than in other
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psychotherapies, that clients in CBT are more distant from their emotional experience, and that
CBT therapists often seek to control or reduce in-session emotional arousal (Mackay, Barkham,
Stiles, & Goldfried, 2002; Watson & Bedard, 2006; Whelton, 2004).
Thus, the manner in which components of CBT-E are defined, conceptualized, and
implemented with clients would be expected not only to maintain a focus on cognitive aspects of
experience, but also to yield distance from and/or diminution of immediate emotional
experience. The treatment in the present study may therefore have facilitated a mode of
processing that was qualitatively different than that described by higher levels of the EXP scale,
which emphasize deep engagement with and elaboration of internal feelings (Klein et al., 1986).
Given these considerations, it appears likely that a primary reason for the limited degree of
emotional experiencing is simply that it was not emphasized, elicited, or encouraged.
Possible Interpretations
Because experiencing has only rarely been measured in CBT, and has never been
examined in the treatment of eating disordered clients, even the finding of an attenuated range
provides potentially useful data relative to the construct of interest. For instance, the relative
absence of “high” EXP scores (5, 6, or 7) in the present sample suggests that clients engaged in
virtually no deep-level experiencing over the course of CBT-E. Nonetheless, as noted
previously, the treatment benefitted a majority of the participants in the study, with an average
difference score of 62.25 on the CHEDS. In light of these findings, there are at least three ways
to interpret the lack of an observed relationship between experiencing and outcomes in the study.
First, it may be that experiencing as here described is not relevant in cognitive-behavioral
treatment of eating disorders. In this case, it would not matter whether moments of deep
experiencing occurred because experiencing would be assumed to have no significant impact on
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the effectiveness of the treatment. However, such an interpretation is inconsistent with past
research suggesting that even low levels of EXP and incremental increases are related to positive
treatment outcome (Fitzpatrick et al., 1999). Moreover, while no relationship was detected
between experiencing and outcome in the present, this result must be considered in light of the
restricted range of EXP scores and the limited sample size, which generally prevent any strong
conclusions with regard to a potential relationship.
The second interpretive possibility is that the observed levels of experiencing were
appropriate to the nature of the treatment. From this perspective, the observation of positive
outcomes despite an absence of deep level experiencing would suggest that client emotional
involvement as described by levels 2-3 of the Experiencing Scale is sufficient for the effective
delivery of interventions within CBT-E. For instance, at Stage 2, the client’s interest in the
narrative is “clear, but superficial” and she does not “refer to or define her feelings.” At Stage 3,
descriptions of feelings and personal reactions are “clear but limited,” while communications of
personal interest are “confined to behavioral terms” (Klein et al., 1986). These statements may
describe a degree of cognitive and emotional engagement not inconsistent with interventions that
target distorted thinking and/or promote restructuring through the presentation and provision of
contradictory or corrective information.
Under this interpretation, experiencing might still be viewed as a common factor
(Castonguay et al., 1996), but it would be regarded as playing a different role in therapeutic
change, and thus having a different relationship to outcome. For instance, it might be said that
experiencing matters in a broad sense, but is more subtle and/or peripheral in CBT treatment of
eating disorders. This interpretation would acknowledge emotional factors as playing a role in
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the treatment of eating disorders, while remaining in line with strong evidence for the therapeutic
benefit of cognitive-behavioral approaches (Wilson & Fairburn, 2002).
A third interpretive possibility is that experiencing is relevant in CBT treatment of eating
disorders, but its therapeutic benefits were not fully realized in the treatment under investigation
here. Under this interpretation, the restricted range of EXP scores would reflect an undesirably
low level of emotional experiencing over the course of the treatment. The basic implication of
such an interpretation is that the therapeutic effects of CBT-E could be further enhanced through
more explicit or direct attention to affective and emotional processes. This position is in line not
only with previous research on the relationship between depth of experiencing and outcome
(Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 2006), but also with recent calls for greater integration of
emotional processes in eating disorder treatment (Fox & Power, 2009) and in CBT generally
(Mahoney, 1991; Mischel, 2004; Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000). Moreover, there is some
precedent in the development of the current CBT-E protocol for increasing attention to emotional
factors. Specifically, the chapter on mood intolerance began as a separate module, but has since
been incorporated into the main “focused” version of the treatment, at least in part due to the
prevalence of mood-triggered changes in eating (Fairburn, 2008, pp. 95, 142).
Potential for Integration
It may be that other elements within the CBT-E framework (e.g., promotion of in-themoment awareness, injunctions to resist habitual escape behaviors) could be expanded to
increase the degree of integrated cognitive-affective processing during treatment. However,
integrative theoretical formulations, along with their implications for treatment, would need to be
very carefully considered. Indeed, Fairburn cautions against “[combining] CBT-E with
conceptually, or procedurally incompatible treatments” (Fairburn, 2008, p. 30). The explicitly
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cognitive emphasis of the CBT-E protocol provides a compelling and comprehensible rationale
for treatment, maintains a clear focus for intervention, and produces therapeutic benefit. Thus,
injudicious or unsystematic efforts to incorporate more integrative or affectively oriented
techniques within this framework might create confusion and/or jeopardize the therapeutic
effects of treatment. For example, direct efforts to deepen in-session experiencing would diverge
from (though not necessarily conflict with) the general cognitive focus of CBT-E, and might
therefore seem jarring or inconsistent to clients if an appropriate and equally comprehensible
rationale for such interventions had not been provided.
As these caveats demonstrate, the notion of increasing emotional processing in CBT-E
raises important questions about the compatibility of experiential and cognitive approaches and
the feasibility of their combination. Could cognitive behavior therapy accommodate increased
attention to and therapeutic focus on emotion? If so, how would relevant principles be
conceptualized and incorporated into the treatment? Could interventions around emotional
processing be appended to CBT in module form? Or would CBT theory and case
conceptualization have to be modified? Can the construct of “emotional processing” be defined
in a way that allows for consistent and meaningful research across theoretical orientations? Or
are the different theoretical approaches too dissimilar in their conceptualization of problems and
therapeutic processes?
Such questions are at the heart of recent efforts to refine understanding of affective
processes in CBT. These include empirical studies that incorporate emotion-focused measures
and techniques (e.g., Castonguay et al., 1996; Castonguay et al., 1998), as well as integrative
reviews that seek to identify common emotional processes across treatment orientations (e.g.,
Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 2006; Whelton, 2004) and/or synthesize research findings on
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processing dynamics as they relate to CBT (e.g., Mischel, 2004). Although further investigation
is needed, these recent endeavors have yielded a growing number of viable avenues for
expanding theory and research on the role of emotional processes in the practice of CBT
(Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000), and for preventing hasty conclusions or haphazard deployment of
interventions (e.g., Westen, 2000). Taken altogether, the fruits of these labors suggest that with
continued research and exploration of relevant implications, it may be possible to lay a
foundation such that in-session emotional processing can, like the mood intolerance component
of CBT-E, “ be readily and appropriately incorporated” during cognitive behavioral treatment
(Fairburn, 2008, p. 142).
In addition, it is instructive to revisit some of the issues raised by Wiser and Arnow
(2001) relative to clients for whom experiencing might be more or less beneficial. Their analysis
would suggest that special care may be warranted relative to facilitating experiencing with eating
disordered clients, given that the arousal and/or expression of intense, painful, or distressing
emotion could trigger overwhelming feelings and/or maladaptive coping strategies (2001). Most
contemporary eating disorder treatments, including the CBT-E protocol, are carefully structured
to help clients regularize their eating behaviors prior to initiating more focused interventions,
precisely to avoid recourse to maladaptive behaviors during the course of treatment (Fairburn,
2008). Nonetheless, the possibility that clients might become confused, dysregulated, or
overwhelmed by experiencing is a concern that deserves careful consideration, particularly in
cases where dysfunctional behaviors, including binge eating, vomiting, and over-exercising, are
precipitated by episodes of emotional upset (Fairburn, 2008). Paired with consistent associations
between disordered eating and emotional processing difficulties (Bydlowski et al., 2005; Taylor
et al., 1996), these caveats underline the importance of adopting a thoughtful approach to
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facilitating the expression and elaboration of in-session emotional experience with this uniquely
vulnerable population.
Limitations
This study has a number of limitations, many of which are related to the size and
homogeneity of the sample. First of all, the initial study included a relatively small number of
eating disordered individuals, further reduced in the present study by the exclusion of clients
diagnosed with anorexia nervosa. Second, there was a lack of demographic variability among
treated individuals, with Caucasian females being overrepresented. This homogeneity in the
sample limits the generalizability of findings to the larger population of eating disordered
individuals. Third, because post-treatment CHEDS scores were used to represent outcome, the
sample size was further restricted by attrition and data irregularities in the initial treatment study.
Thus, while experiencing data was generated for the majority of participants, missing data in
many cases precluded analysis relative to post-treatment outcome.
A fourth limitation was relatively low reliability between raters, particularly for ratings of
baseline EXP. This result may reflect methodological issues related to rater training, as well as
even more restricted range of experiencing, given that baseline ratings were made during an
interaction prior to the initiation of treatment proper. Nonetheless, regardless of its source, low
inter-rater reliability clearly limited the precision of statistical analyses, and thus, our ability to
draw valid inferences relative to the phenomena of interest.
Finally, specific disruptions of cognitive-affective processing (e.g., alexithymia,
experiential avoidance) were not measured directly, preventing assessment of their impact on
outcome and other aspects of treatment, including the restricted range of experiencing. Although
LESS data represented some consideration of some similar processes, and the EXP scale itself
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has been described as “[placing] insight-processing, rumination, and avoidance on the same
continuum as a single variable” (A. M. Hayes et al., 2007), these measures offered less
conceptual clarity than would construct-specific instruments, and thus, supported only hesitant
and/or tangential claims with regard to processing difficulties in the current sample.
Conclusion
This study contributes to knowledge regarding emotional processes in cognitivebehavioral therapy for eating disorders. Specifically, results showed an attenuated range of insession client experiencing during CBT-E for eating disorders (Fairburn, 2008). Although this
restricted range limited the utility of statistical analyses, it also suggested that in-session feelings
rarely became the immediate focus of deep reflection and elaboration during CBT-E. This
finding is consistent with other investigations of emotional processing in cognitive behavior
therapy, and raises questions about the role of affective and emotional factors in therapeutic
change for different populations and across different orientations to treatment.
Future studies of emotional processing in eating disorder treatment should incorporate
measures that account for both verbal and non-verbal aspects of communication. It will also be
important to expand investigation to populations with greater diversity in terms of age, ethnicity,
and other demographic variables. Direct assessment of core processing deficits associated with
eating disorders could provide greater opportunity not only to ascertain their impact on treatment
processes and outcomes, but also to investigate whether treatment interventions have
ameliorative effects relative to such deficits. In addition, it may be useful to identify and code
segments of therapy during which clients are processing material relative to core themes of their
treatment.
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It’s still an open question whether outcomes could be enhanced by incorporating more
affective and emotional factors into the conceptualization and implementation of CBT-E (and
other cognitive behavioral treatments). Theory and research regarding common factors and
unique population characteristics should continue to inform and refine relevant discussions and
efforts toward integration.
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